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The Competition for Water: 




Faced with water scarcity amid rising demand from a growing
economy and population, Alberta is a bellwether region on water
management issues. Without a modern system for reallocating
access to water, particularly from prior licence holders to new
users, Alberta’s economic development and its ecosystems could 
be threatened.
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GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONSWith many water resources overcommitted and suffering environmental degradation, it is
becoming urgent to find ways to reallocate increasingly scarce water supplies to meet rising
demand and growing environmental concerns. In Canada, this challenge is nowhere better
illustrated than in Alberta.
The province is home to 60 percent of all irrigation in Canada and has a fast-growing
population and economy. These pressures helped prompt the province to halt the issuance of
new licences for taking water from the Bow, Oldman and South Saskatchewan River sub-
basins in 2006, bringing into focus the need to fulfill rising demand for industrial, urban, and
environmental water use. 
Without a reliable mechanism for transferring water access rights from prior holders to new
users, Alberta’s continued economic development and its ecosystems could be threatened. 
This Commentary discusses how water markets could be used in the Alberta context and what
supporting institutions would be necessary to enable them to operate efficiently. Indeed,
urgent action is needed within the current legislative framework to enable a better
distribution of water resources. 
As a prerequisite for the efficient allocation of water among competing users, the most
pressing task is for the Alberta government to define waters within each watershed that need
to be protected to secure environmental and other public benefits. Reforms should also aim
to improve existing licence structures and introduce mechanisms to encourage water markets
to operate more efficiently. 
Also needed is a focus on longer-term solutions, such as consideration of whether the current
first-in-time-first-in-right property rights system is the most appropriate way to allocate and
manage access to increasingly scarce water resources. 
Although this study focuses on surface water and the South Saskatchewan River basin, and
solutions to water resources management inevitably must be region specific, discussions in
this Commentary could be adapted to other regions of Canada where water scarcity is a
growing issue, including some watersheds in Ontario, the southern parts of the Prairies
provinces, and in British Columbia’s Okanagan Valley.
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W
ater resources in many parts
of the world are under
increasing pressure.
Escalating demand for water, fuelled
by unprecedented population and
economic growth during the past
century, has led to intense
competition for, and conflicts over,
available resources. 
To encourage irrigation, food production, and
development, thousands of new dams and
irrigation projects have been constructed and water
supplied in generous volumes at little or no cost to
users, often on relatively low-value commodity
crops, unsuitable soils, and in inappropriate
locations. In many places, this has led to serious
environmental problems. 
With many water resources overcommitted and
suffering environmental degradation, it is
becoming urgent to find ways to reduce the
current level of extraction and to reallocate
increasingly scarce water supplies to meet rising
demand and growing environmental concerns. In
many overextended basins, some 80 percent of the
water is extracted for irrigation, but since irrigated
farming is the economic engine of many rural
regions, reducing access to water for this purpose
in favour of urban and more environmentally
friendly uses could have serious negative
socioeconomic effects, including loss of farm
revenue and subsequent decline in local business
activity and job opportunities. It is imperative,
therefore, that institutions and instruments
facilitate the reallocation of water from low-value,
inefficient uses in unsuitable locations to higher-
value and more efficient uses in ways that
minimize such effects on farmers and their
communities.
Canada boasts some of the world’s largest bodies
of fresh water and many mighty rivers, but its
water supplies are unevenly distributed. Water is
abundant in Central Canada, along the West
Coast and in the North, but the southern parts of
the Prairie provinces are dry and water scarcity is
emerging in British Columbia’s Okanagan Valley
and in some watersheds in Ontario. How should
Canadians deal with this scarcity? 
Alberta is a useful place to consider in assessing
the available policy options since the province is
home to 60 percent of all irrigation in Canada
(Statistics Canada 2007) and has a fast-growing
population and economy. These pressures
contributed to Alberta’s  halting the issuance of
new licences for the South Saskatchewan River
basin, bringing into focus the need to fulfill rising
demand for industrial, urban, and environmental
water use. Although Alberta has made significant
progress with new water legislation and its Water
for Life strategy, positioning the province as a
leader in water management, further improve-
ments are necessary. This need was acknowledged
in 2009 with the release of three reports: i) by the
Minister’s Advisory Group to provide advice on
water management and allocation (MAG, 2009),
ii) by the Alberta Water Council (AWC, 2009),
and iii) by the Alberta Water Research Institute
(AWRI, 2009).
This Commentary discusses how water markets
could be used in the Alberta context and what
supporting institutions would be necessary to
enable them to operate efficiently. Indeed, urgent
action is needed within the current legislative
framework to enable a better distribution of water
resources. As a prerequisite for the efficient
allocation of water among competing users, the
most pressing task is for the Alberta government to
define waters within each watershed that need to
be protected to secure environmental and other
public benefits. Reforms should also aim to
improve existing licence structures and introduce
mechanisms to encourage water markets to operate
more efficiently. Also needed is a focus on longer-
term solutions, such as consideration of whether
the current first-in-time-first-in-right property
rights system is the most appropriate way to
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water resources. Although this study focuses on
surface water and the South Saskatchewan River
basin, and solutions to water resources
management inevitably must be region specific,
one hopes that the discussions in this
Commentary can be adapted to other regions of
Canada.1 It is imperative, however, that
policymakers do not postpone immediate reforms
while considering longer-term solutions.
Experience in other jurisdictions strongly suggests
that the longer inevitable decisions are
postponed, the more entrenched conflicts over
water become and the more expensive it will be –
in economic, social, and political terms – to
introduce reforms. Finally, robust, sustainable
water management and allocation processes must
be able to adapt to changing climate conditions
and community values.
The Alberta Context
Traditionally, water allocation in Alberta reflected
the myth that water was plentiful: new water
licences were issued whenever new users requested
them, resulting in the area under irrigation
increasing from 19,223 hectares in 1911 to
495,786 hectares in 2008, with the sharpest
increase coming after 1970 (Alberta 2009). Until
recently, water licences in Alberta were issued
without term but were generally considered by
licensees and lenders to be in perpetuity.2 Licences
are based on the first-in-time-first-in-right
(FITFIR) principle, which prioritizes licence
holders’ access to water according to the date their
licence was issued – that is, during periods of
scarcity, the holders of older licences are entitled to
receive their total licensed volume of water before
holders of newer licences. There is increasing
recognition, however, of the scarcity of water
resources in southern Alberta, and over the past
decade the provincial government has taken steps
to change the way water is managed. For instance,
the 1999 Water Act and the 2000 Irrigation
Districts Act provided for the introduction of water
allocation transfers and water assignments – the
right to use a volume of water during a given
season – from one licence holder to another.3 (See
Glossary of Terms on page 21.)
In November 2003, Alberta released a strategy
paper, Water for Life (Alberta 2003a),
acknowledging that, without changes, future
demand for water to ensure continued economic
growth, to support a growing population, and to
secure healthy rivers and lakes is likely to exceed
available supply. The strategy sets ambitious
objectives to be achieved by 2015, such as a 30
percent increase in water use efficiency and
productivity. The strategy assumes that the
introduction of market-based instruments and
best-management practices, public participation
in watershed-planning processes, and the
reallocation of water from existing users to meet
anticipated increases in demand from industry,
urban users, and the environment all will help to
achieve its objectives. Alberta renewed its
commitment to the strategy in 2008 (Alberta
2008), and in 2009, through the Alberta Water
Council, all major sectors of the economy agreed
to develop measurable water conservation plans
and targets within the next two years to
demonstrate how they expect to achieve the
strategy’s goals (Taylor 2009). The most water-
intensive sector, the irrigation sector, released a
draft report in June 2009 (AIPA 2009).
The urgency for policy reform was emphasized
in the background papers to the Draft South
Saskatchewan River Basin Management Plan
(Alberta 2005), which notes that:
￿ 22 of 33 main Alberta rivers are suffering
moderate environmental effects from increased
water stress caused by current levels of water
extraction for consumptive use, 5 more are
suffering heavier environmental effects, and 3
are environmentally degraded;
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￿ demand from non-irrigation users could
increase by 35 to 67 percent by 2021 and by
52 to 136 percent by 2046;
￿ districts under irrigation could expand by 10
percent and 20 percent in the Oldman and
Bow River basins, respectively; and,
￿ the population in the South Saskatchewan
River basin is expected to grow from
approximately 1.3 million in 1996 to more
than 2 million by 2021 and to more than 3
million by 2046.
The first practical consequence of the increased
level of stress in the South Saskatchewan River
basin occurred in 1991, when Alberta capped
water allocations for irrigation. Continued stress,
exacerbated by a 2001 drought, resulted in Alberta
Environment’s placing a moratorium on additional
surface water licences for the southern tributaries
of the Oldman River (Alberta 2003b). In 2005,
the ministry announced it would no longer accept
applications for new allocations from the Bow,
Oldman, and South Saskatchewan River sub-
basins until it could determine how water not
currently allocated should be used (Alberta 2005).
As a consequence, the extraction of surface water
and hydrologically connected groundwater for all
forms of consumptive use has now been capped.
Looking ahead, changing community values
will increase pressure to retain more water in-
stream for environmental, recreational, and
cultural purposes. Under the Water for Life
strategy, community-based Water Planning and
Advisory Committees identify and advise the
environment minister on water conservation
objectives. Water conservation objectives are
defined under the Water Act as the amount and
quality of water necessary to protect the aquatic
environment as well as recreational, tourism,
transportation, and waste assimilation uses of
water. Climate change is also likely to alter the
distribution of precipitation, reduce snow melt,
and increase evaporation (Schindler and Donahue
2006). All these factors will further increase water
scarcity for consumptive use during periods of
peak demand and strain water-management and
allocation processes.
The province’s largest extractors of fresh water
are irrigators in the south, who, individually or as
members of irrigation districts, control three-
quarters of all allocated water (Alberta 2002), a
large percentage of which is used to produce
relatively low-value crops (AIPA 2002). With
continued growth and diversification of the
economy, increased demand for non-extractive
uses, and decreased supply due to climate change,
it seems inevitable that some of the water
presently extracted by irrigators will have to be
reallocated to other uses. 
The Water for Life strategy stresses the key role
of economic instruments in meeting water
conservation and productivity objectives. It places
a strong emphasis on respecting the rights of
existing water users, which implies that no water
user will be forced to give up water or to adopt
certain management practices or water-use
technologies. It further emphasizes voluntary
processes, the development of education
programs, improved public participation, and the
use of market-based instruments.
While the pressure is clearly most urgent in the
South Saskatchewan River basin, the water
allocation mechanisms for northern rivers are also
in need of reform. There, the problem is not to
reallocate volumes of water among competing
users within a closed basin; rather, it is to allow
current and new users to gain access to water
licences of a seniority that suits their risk profile
and the vulnerability of their production to
uncertain supplies. Given the nature of the
FITFIR system, the need to reallocate water
licences will emerge well before the need to close
basins arises. In these basins, some users might
want to obtain very senior licences to ensure
supply during periods of the most severe scarcity
and into the future; others might prefer an
assortment of licences of different priority.
Alberta’s Experience with Water Trading
Water trading has been an option in Alberta since
1999, but its uptake has been very limited. Only
during the very dry season of 2001 did trading in
assignments of the right to use water flourish and
play an important role in reallocating water
among competing agricultural users (Nicol and
Klein 2006). Transfer of licensed water allocations| 4 Commentary 302 
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has never taken hold, and very few market
transactions, representing “arm’s-length” transfers
between different users in exchange for money,
have taken place. Most such transfers have been
changes in the point of diversion to improve
licence holders’ ability to manage water, rather
than changes of ownership. Analysis of the few
“arm’s-length” transactions conducted over the
first five years since water trading was allowed
indicates that sellers were selling water that they
did not need, while buyers were purchasing water
to secure more reliable access to water as the
commodities they are producing are sensitive to
timing and accuracy of application of irrigation
water (Nicol, Klein and Bjornlund, 2008).
The reason for the low level of water trading
seems to be that the process involves several
lengthy stages of document and survey preparation
and collection of data, as well as public and
government review. While the actual cost of
transfer is comparable with, and even on the low
side of, international experience, would-be traders
view the long time delays and uncertainty about
the final outcome as major obstacles and they
express a high level of frustration with the process.
Traders further point out that it is not easy for
buyers and sellers to find each other and even more
difficult to establish a market price due to scarcity
of information (Nicol, Klein and Bjornlund 2008).
More generally, there is very little support for the
use of market-based instruments within the
irrigation sector. In a 2006 survey of managers and
members of the boards of directors of the 13
irrigation districts, only 24 percent agreed with the
use of market-based instruments, with 8 percent
agreeing with the use of transfer of licensed water
allocations and 15 percent with water assignments
(Bjornlund, Nicol, and Klein 2007). 
Since trading began, the largest single transfer
has been to secure supply for a large new
development at Balzac, north of Calgary. This
transfer met with numerous protests and, even
though it was beneficial to the Western Irrigation
District – the seller of the water entitlements – it
was approved by only a narrow margin (Nicol,
Bjornlund, and Klein 2010). Indeed, in the wider
community, trading has been viewed with great
suspicion, with protests registered not only against
the Balzac transfer but also against attempts to free
up irrigation districts’ ability to trade (see
Droitsch 2007; Ecojustice and Bow Riverkeeper
2008). While some district licences, such as that
of the St. Mary River Irrigation District, were
amended in the past to allow districts to deliver
water for non-agricultural purposes, when the
Eastern Irrigation District applied in 2007 for
similar amendments it was met with protests, and
the provincial government halted the process
pending the completion of further investigation.
Opponents argued that allowing the district more
transfer flexibility amounted to circumventing the
rigorous assessments associated with the transfer
of licensed water allocations. 
Although the Alberta government’s intentions
to introduce market-based instruments are
embedded in its Water for Life strategy, it has now
stopped amending district licences to permit more
flexible water management and use, including the
ability to supply the non-irrigation sector. This
may be shortsighted because such amendments
could allow districts to supply cities and industries
with water when not needed for irrigation without
permanently relinquishing control over the water,
which would be totally in line with one of the 
key objectives of the Water for Life strategy and
increase the likelihood that irrigators would 
accept such transfers.
These examples of community conflict over
water trading, combined with the clear
recognition in the Water for Life strategy of the
benefits of reallocating water to meet new
demand, underscore the need for a new
framework for water trading in Alberta.
The Move to Market Reallocation
Mechanisms
In many regions of the world, water entitlements
are established in a way that gives governments
authority to reallocate water under certain
conditions or within certain time intervals. In
other places, legislative changes are required to
provide governments such authority. Given
sufficient political will, a centralized reallocation
process could be used, but there are very few
examples of this. In most jurisdictions,
entitlements to water are perceived to be
perpetual. Entitlement holders make significant
investments to use the water, and the value of thewater is usually reflected in land prices and on
farm or household balance sheets. Draconian
reallocation of water using government powers
therefore is likely to generate significant political
costs and prolonged legal battles over
compensation. Further, in both economic and
political terms, it is difficult to define a set of
criteria to determine which licence holders should
have their licences cancelled/reduced, who to
grant new licences to, how much to pay for
cancelled licences and how much to charge for
new licences. Accordingly, in many places, such as
Australia, the southwestern United States, South
Africa, and Chile, water markets are relied on to
facilitate reallocation of water because they involve
voluntary transactions between willing sellers and
buyers where both parties consider they are better
off after the transaction. 
The shift toward treating water as an economic
good – a good sold at a price – gained momentum
with the Rio Convention and Agenda 21 in 1992
(see Sitarz 1993) and with the announcement by
the World Bank of a new water policy in 1993,
including the introduction of concepts such as full-
cost-recovery water charges, privatization of the
water industry, private property rights in water,
and water markets (World Bank 1993). However,
water is commonly perceived primarily as a social
good – a non-priced good for everyone’s benefit –
to be allocated in pursuit of social objectives (see
Appelgren and Klohn 1999). Hence, attempts to
introduce market-based systems have met with
opposition and even, in some cases, violence
(Gunatilake and Gopalakrishnan 2002; Hall,
Lobina, and de la Motte 2005).
In places where water markets have been
introduced, two important, distinct sub-markets
have developed. In one, the long-term entitlement
to receive water allocations each season is traded –
this has often been termed the “permanent
market,” the “water rights market,” or, in Alberta,
the “market for licensed water allocations.” In the
remainder of this paper, this market is referred to as
the “entitlement market.” In the second sub-
market, the short-term right to use a certain
volume of the seasonal allocation of water is traded,
while the seller continues to own the long-term
entitlement – this market is sometimes called the
“temporary market,” the “short-term market,” the
“spot market,” or, in Alberta, “assignments” of the
right to use water. In the remainder of this paper,
this market is termed the “allocation market.”
Water Market Challenges and
Limitations
Despite the strong economic and political
rationales for water trading, only a few countries
have formally introduced water markets. In some
developing countries, such as India and Pakistan,
informal and, in many instances illegal allocation
markets have been active. In other countries, such
as Spain and Oman, variations of water trading
have been used for a long time (Maas and
Anderson 1978; Al-Marshudi 2007). Markets
have been implemented in only a few countries
for a number of reasons, which can be grouped
under the categories of capacity challenges,
community and social concerns, and public
interest concerns.4
Capacity Challenges
Capacity challenges are associated with the need
for complex institutional and governance
structures, including:
￿ well-defined, secure, and enforceable
entitlements to interests in water;
￿ secure registers of water entitlements on which
transfers, mortgages and other third-party
interests can be registered and enforced;
￿ metering devices to measure water use;
￿ monitoring and enforcement processes to
protect interests in water and the integrity of
the system;
￿ governance structures to protect public
interests in water; and
￿ market processes and market intermediaries
that communicate the supply of, and demand
for, water and facilitate the transfer process.
Commentary 302  | 5
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Provision of these systems requires extensive
human and financial capital that is absent in many
developing countries. And even in developed
countries that can afford it, the political will is
often not present.
Community and Social Concerns 
The introduction of water markets is associated
with a high level of community concern over their
anticipated social and community effects and,
therefore, such markets have always met
considerable opposition. Farmers, in particular,
have been reluctant to adopt water markets. They
are concerned about the impact on their
operations if substantial volumes of water are
traded out of their supply system, fearing that the
cost of water supply will go up and the long-term
viability of their irrigation system will be
challenged, that landowners who sell the water
will leave land abandoned and uncultivated, and
that water will be consolidated in major corporate
entities or speculators who will control who get
access to water at what price. Irrigators are
concerned that substantial transfers of water out
of their communities will result in losses of jobs
and services and threaten the long-term viability
of their rural communities. Such effects have been
clearly identified in places, including in Australia
and the United States. However, many would
argue that these changes are an inevitable part of a
structural adjustment process in agriculture and
are likely to take place regardless of the operation
of water markets. In fact, it has been argued (see
Appendix) that water markets allow this structural
adjustment to take place in a more orderly
fashion, with those who choose to exit the
industry departing in a better position.
Nonetheless, the concerns of farmers and
irrigators are serious and persistent and present an
impediment to the adoption of water markets. In
Alberta, the debate over the Balzac transfer and
the amendment of district licences suggests that
this is indeed a major issue.
Public Interest Concerns
Concerns about the public interest relate to
securing water for public benefits, particularly to
ensure adequate in-stream flows that support
healthy ecosystems and that permit
environmentally useful events such as flooding to
encourage seed germination. Public benefits also
include social and community needs, such as
those discussed above, or water for recreational
and cultural purposes. What is considered to be an
adequate supply of water for public benefits has to
be defined in accordance with local community
values supported by the best available science. By
themselves, markets likely cannot provide supplies
of water adequate to ensure public benefits, since
markets operate between individuals who seek to
maximize their individual benefits.
Ensuring Water Markets Function Effectively
These capacity challenges and concerns need to be
addressed by appropriate policy reforms in order
for markets to operate effectively. In most
societies, however, there has been a tendency to
postpone major water reforms. Often, such delay
is preferable because water management reform is
associated with a high level of conflict among
competing users, emotional debates, and
significant community pain. Further, individual
users usually have long-standing rights to water
resources that, in many cases, are associated with
substantial capital investments. Changing the way
people can use and access such rights, therefore,
can have serious socioeconomic effects on both
resource users and the communities that depend
on the resource as the engine of economic activity.
International experience suggests, however, that it
is actually a lot easier and cheaper in economic,
social, and political terms to introduce water
reforms before scarcity intensifies conflicts over
access and use. 
Experience from Australia suggests that water
scarcity can emerge very quickly and drive urgent,
and therefore often not properly considered,
reforms. To manage increased scarcity, water
markets were considered a key instrument. As a
result, the number of transfers in some areas
increased sharply over a period of a few yearsCommentary 302  | 7
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during the late 1990s, from several hundred a year
to more than 3,000. From 1993 to 2004, market
participation increased from less than 2 percent to
more than 60 percent of all farm businesses each
year. This helped drive the price of water
entitlements and allocations upward at annual
rates of growth of 12.9 percent and 25.6 percent,
respectively, from 1993 to 2009 (Bjornlund and
Rossini 2010). This sharp increase in market
activity caught water managers by complete
surprise, and neither the authorities nor the
systems in place had the capacity to cope with it.
There is no reason to believe that something
similar could not happen in Alberta and other
places in Canada. Indeed, tree ring studies suggest
that Alberta and other prairie provinces are at risk
of prolonged periods with significantly more
scarcity than what was experienced in 2001
(Sauchyn and Skinner 2001). Hence, the
Australian experience should encourage the
development of institutional reforms needed to
live with such scarcity at minimum socioeconomic
cost without compromising water set aside to
safeguard the public interest. The lesson is also
that it is better to get started on policy reforms
before scarcity grows and reforms become too
complicated.
Solutions for Alberta
Experience from other countries suggests that
many issues are associated with the introduction
of water markets. How can this experience apply
to the Alberta context? With the development and
implementation of the province’s Water for Life
strategy, building on the foundation of the Water
Act and, to some extent, the Irrigation District Act,
significant progress has been made toward
securing more sustainable water management and
achieving the three main objects of the strategy: to
secure safe secure drinking water supplies, healthy
aquatic ecosystems, and reliable- quality water
supplies for a sustainable economy. The recent
conflict over the Balzac water transfer and the
amendment of district licences to provide water
for non-agricultural users – driven in part by
uncertainty over securing water to safeguard
public benefits – suggest, however, that the
existing framework might not be the most
appropriate to best serve Albertans as water
scarcity intensifies. 
Alberta thus should embark on a three-step
reform process. The first step should secure water
to safeguard the public interest, the second should
improve allocation/licence structures and registers,
and the third should improve existing market
mechanisms, processes, and instruments.
Step 1: Secure Water to Safeguard 
the Public Interest
Without first properly securing protected water to
safeguard the public interest, markets will not be
able to operate efficiently in reallocating the
resource available for consumptive use or to deliver
the anticipated environmental, social, and
economic benefits. It is strongly recommended that
two components of protected waters be identified
to secure water conservation objectives for each
watershed. One is an in-stream flow component, to
secure sufficient river flow to maintain healthy
ecosystems that ensure adequate water quality for
human consumption, recreation and, economic use
while taking into account evaporation and other
transmission losses. The other is an environmental
events component, to secure regular environmental
events such as flooding of surrounding riparian
lands to facilitate germination of seeds and in other
ways to support the lifecycle of flora and fauna.
Once these protected waters are defined, it is
possible to determine the consumptive component
of water flow – the volume of water available for
extractive use that the market should be able to
move freely around among competing uses without
compromising water conservation objectives. In an
unregulated system, this component could be
termed the “consumptive flow”; in a regulated
system, it could be termed the “consumptive pool.” 
Protected waters should be defined at both the
watershed and basin level as part of a planning
process that reflects local hydraulic and
environmental conditions, including the link
between ground and surface water, local
community values, and best available scientific
evidence. It is imperative that such planning and
the associated protected waters are defined within| 8 Commentary 302 
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an adaptive framework subject to regular review. It
should be explicit that protected waters will be
revised and adjusted if new scientific evidence
proves that the volume of water set aside to
achieve water conservation objectives needs to be
adjusted. In most instances, the environment
minister instructs Water Planning and Advisory
Committees to identify water conservation
objectives as part of the planning process; there is
no reason this system could not continue. There
are problems, however, with providing these
groups of unpaid volunteers the financial and
technical resources and processes to enable them
to produce appropriate and meaningful advice.
In areas where protected waters have not yet
been established, it is strongly recommended that
the regional directors of Alberta Environment be
instructed to set interim conservative levels of
protected waters so that markets can be
established and adopted by consumptive users.5
THE PROBLEM WITH FITFIR:The in-stream flow
component of protected waters should be defined
outside the licensing and FITFIR system – that is,
river-flow requirements should be satisfied before
licence holders are permitted to extract water –
otherwise the whole concept of securing protected
waters to allow the market to reallocate the
balance would be compromised. If the in-stream
flow component of protected waters were issued as
a FITFIR licence, with the date that the water
management plan defining them is approved, then
on many rivers – especially in the South
Saskatchewan River basin – such licences would
be very junior. Hence, during periods of drought,
when in-stream flow is most critical, senior
consumptive licence holders would be allowed to
extract water first, and little would be left in the
river with which to achieve water conservation
objectives. Securing in-stream flow with FITFIR
licences is especially a problem in fully or
overcommitted watersheds, but it would also be a
problem in an adaptive regime where water
conservation objectives defined today, while based
on the best available science, are not final but
subject to review as understanding of
environmental needs within a changing climate
improves. If a review in 10 years’ time proves that
the protected waters set aside to secure water
conservation objectives must be increased, then
additional waters would be secured by ever more
junior and thereby marginal licences. 
Alberta’s Water for Life strategy correctly points
out that increased water use efficiency is an
essential component of saving water and thereby
creating “new” water to meet increased demand
from existing and new users. In this context,
however, two issues should be considered. First,
most water saved by increased efficient use results
in reduced return flow, which reduces downstream
river flow. Second, since licence holders have the
consumptive right to the full volume of water they
are allowed to extract, if they increase their water
use efficiency it is up to them to decide how to use
that saved water. Economically rational licence
holders will either use that water to increase
production or sell it to other users who will put it
to consumptive use. In this case, increased water
use efficiency will result in less water being
returned to the river, compromising any protected
water supported by junior licences. While
increased water use efficiency will save water and
increase productivity – one of the objectives of the
Water for Life strategy – it will not necessarily
conserve water to meet conservation objectives.6
To continue to give existing users an incentive to
increase water-use efficiency while protecting
conservation objectives, the provincial government
could purchase that part of the saved water that
results in reduced return flow. This would ensure
that water savings from efficiency gains lead to
water conservation as well as increased
productivity.
On the other hand, the environmental events
component of protected waters could be secured
by licences equivalent to those held by
consumptive users and controlled by a water
conservation objective custodian, which could be
either a government department or, preferably, an
independent body acting under a set of
5 “Conservative” is stressed since experience shows that, unless consumptive rights are granted on a share basis, they are very difficult to claw back.
On the other hand, it is much easier to grant additional licences if the interim level of protected water proves too high.
6 This problem is currently the subject of extensive debate in Australia; see Crase and O’Keefe (2009).Commentary 302  | 9
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regulations. In that way, the custodian could trade
water that is not needed to secure the conservation
objectives for which it was protected – for
example, during periods of drought when creating
environmental events such as flooding of riparian
land would not be feasible and consumptive users
are likely to be willing to pay relatively high prices
in the allocation market. The revenue from such
sales would allow the custodian to purchase even
more water during periods of high flow when it
becomes more feasible to trigger, say, flooding and
consumptive users are likely to be willing sellers at
lower prices. As long as FITFIR licences secure
protected waters, the environmental events
component of protected waters, when first
identified, should be secured by a portfolio of
licences with different priorities, making it
possible for the custodian to manage the waters to
achieve conservation objectives effectively.
THE CHALLENGE OFOVERCOMMITTED SOURCES
AND UNUSED OR UNDERUSED LICENCES: Pivotal
in balancing environmental, social, and economic
uses of water is how to deal with fully and
overcommitted watersheds and how to handle
unused or underused licences. Where conservation
objectives are secured through the planning
process, it is important that all the water set aside
for extractive use is used in the most efficient and
productive way; hence, it would be beneficial to
activate unused or underused licences to minimize
negative socioeconomic effects of the process. 
In overcommitted or fully committed
watersheds, the effect of activating unused or
underused licences differs depending on how
protected waters are secured. If licences are
granted under the FITFIR principle, activating
previously unused or underused licences would
seriously compromise conservation objectives. As
more senior unused or underused licences are
activated, less and less water would be available for
conservation objectives during the most critical
periods. Currently, in the South Saskatchewan
River basin, only 55 percent of allocated water is
used in an average year (AMEC Earth and
Environment 2007) and in-stream flow needs are
supported by the remaining 45 percent.7
If this water, held by more senior licences, were
activated, little would be left to meet conservation
objectives. If, on the other hand, protected waters
were set aside outside the FITFIR system,
activation of unused and underused licences
would result in a less secure supply for junior
licence holders, who would be increasingly cut off
during droughts. Hence, under the first scenario it
would be the environment that would bear the
cost of activating unused or underused licences,
while under the second scenario it would be
junior licence holders. One way to alleviate the
problem under both scenarios would be for the
provincial government to enter the water market
and buy out unused or underused licences or to
invoke its limited powers under the Water Act to
cancel or claw back licences. 
It is imperative to deal with the issue of unused
and underused licences before the value of water
increases as a result of further scarcity within a
closed basin and before higher water values
become entrenched in the system. Before trading,
such licences have little value, so that cancelling
them likely would lead to less conflict and the cost
of buying them out would be reduced. Activating
such licences also might result in declining
allocations, forcing active irrigators to buy
additional water from those who have not invested
in using their water, which might be considered
an inequitable wealth transfer (Bjornlund 2004a).
Step 2: Improve Existing Allocation/Licence
Structures and Registers
Currently, licences in Alberta are based on the
FITFIR principle, to which the Water for Life
strategy is committed. It is unlikely, however, that
the FITFIR principle in its current form will
continue to be the best mechanism with which to
manage increasingly scarce water resources for a
sustainable environment and sustainable
communities (see, for example, Taylor 2009);
accordingly alternative solutions are needed for
the medium to long term. Standing in the way of
7 It should be noted here that Alberta has an obligation under the Master Agreement on Apportionment to allow, in general term, half the water
originating in the eastern stream to flow across the border to Saskatchewan. | 10 Commentary 302 
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reform of the water licence system, however, are
such obstacles as financial commitments made on
the basis of current FITFIR licences and
emotional attachment to the current system. The
process of reform, therefore, should be inclusive
and sensitive to current licence holders, with due
consideration of appropriate transition
arrangements and compensation.
If it were possible to introduce a new allocation
mechanism on a blank slate, the most effective
and robust system to manage increased scarcity
would be one in which the licence holder is
entitled to a share of the annual consumptive
component of water as defined by a series of
adaptive water management plans for each
watershed. In this way, the holder would have a
secure, long-term right to a certain share, while
protected waters could be adjusted to take into
account environmental needs, changing climatic
conditions, and shifting societal values. Such a
system should be combined with a risk-sharing
arrangement between consumptive users and the
provincial government about who should carry
the cost of future changes to the consumptive
pool. If the consumptive component were reduced
as a result of new scientific knowledge or climate
change, the consumptive users would take the 
risk associated with the reductions up to a certain
defined threshold while the federal and provin-
cial governments would take the risk associated
with additional reductions. On the other hand,
risks associated with reductions caused by
changing societal values would be carried by
government alone (CoAG 2004).8 All such shares
(or licences) should be of equal seniority so that,
during periods of scarcity, all would share the 
pain equally. 
That said, since a new allocation mechanism
will not be introduced on a blank slate, a modified
FITFIR system might be the most appropriate
and cost-effective alternative. One modification
could be to create two or three “bands of priority”
– say, high, medium, and low security licences
based on current seniority. Under such a system,
all licence holders in the high security band –
those with seniority prior to a certain year –
would receive their water before licence holders in
the medium security band. Within each band, all
irrigators would be equal and would receive water
according to their share. While this option is less
flexible than the share system mentioned above, it
would allow users to create a “portfolio” of
licences that suits their risk profile. Either of these
systems would ease the operation of water markets
and the determination of market prices, as buyers
would know more clearly what to expect when
buying a water share since all would have the same
priority either across all licences or within each
band. After all, buyers’ willingness to pay depends
on the water scarcity level as well as on the
security of getting access to it on a seasonal basis.
During the drought of 2001, licence holders, in
fact, entered into a voluntary agreement to share
available water and to suspend the FITFIR rules
of access – a positive outcome and one to the
credit of irrigators and their leaders at the time,
but not a permanent solution.
Clearly, the transition from the current FITFIR
system to either of the options proposed would
change fundamentally the way in which
uncertainty is shared. It would also cause a high
level of anxiety among current senior licence
holders, so it is an objective best tackled over the
medium to long term. Transition processes could
include an exchange rate from the current
seniority-based volumetric licences to new, share-
based licences. Under such a system, what are now
the most senior licences would get a larger share of
the consumptive component than their current
volumetric licence would suggest. Take the
example of the holder of a licence to a thousand
cubic meters of water in a river with a total
licensed volume of one million cubic metres. This
would suggest that the licence holder should have
a 0.1 percent share of the consumptive pool.
However, within a system with vastly different
priority dates, the holder of the most senior
licence on the river might get a 0.2 percent share
under the new system, while the most junior
licence holder might get only get 0.03 or 0.05
percent. In this way, irrigators would trade off
volumes for certainty.
8 This risk sharing arrangement is currently in place in Australia under the National Water Initiative SEPARATE WATER ACCESS FROM LAND
OWNERSHIP: Currently, all water licences in
Alberta are registered with Alberta Environment
under the Water Act. These licences are associated
with specific parcels of land and specific extraction
points. Irrigation districts, which control 37
percent of the licensed volume in the province,
hold by far the largest licences with the oldest
priorities (AIPA 2002; AMEC Earth and
Environment 2007). Individual irrigators are
registered on district assessment rolls and have a
right to water in accordance with the number of
acres registered on the rolls. Further, all irrigators
within a certain district have the same priority
under the FITFIR principle. 
Control over water access and use is linked to
land. Hence, approval of the transfer of licensed
water allocations is associated with an assessment
of the new land to which the water use will be
attached, as well as the impact of water use on that
land and the change of location of the point of
extraction. Irrigation transfers to purchasers
outside the district require the agreement by
plebiscite of the majority of district irrigators,
which complicates the transfer process. 
A better process would be to separate the
ownership of land and water so that the transfer of
water could take place without the legal
complications associated with land ownership.
Further, separating the ownership of the licence
from the right to use the water would ease the
transfer process, as it would separate the trading
process from the approval of use process. Trading
then would become less complicated and risks of
successful transfers would be eliminated for sellers,
while buyers would be able to balance the risk of
subsequently obtaining the right to use the water
against that of fluctuating water market prices and
other factors that influence supply and demand in
the market (for a more extensive discussion, see
the Appendix).9 This uncertainty would be
reduced significantly if more predictable trading
processes were put in place, as will be outlined in
step 3. It is this separation that often causes
concern over the ability of speculators and
“outsiders” to buy up large volumes of water
within a basin and subsequently to decide who
gets the right to use it and at what price. However,
if protected waters were defined and secured first
and the right to use the water was separated from
the right to own it, speculators could not cause
environmental harm. Further, it would be
worthwhile for speculators to own water only if
they subsequently sold or leased it to people or
companies with a use right within the zone in
which the water could be used.
WATER REGISTERS AND MONITORING: Reforms
will require more elaborate licence registers. If the
valuable water asset were separated from the land,
then it would have to be possible to register and
secure the same interest in the water asset as it is
currently possible to do with the land asset. This
register would also have to record any additional
purchases or sales of water entitlements so that the
current level of entitlement associated with each
licence was recorded at any given time.
Accounting processes would need to be in place to
ensure that the total volume of entitlements
within any give water resource was kept constant.
A separate set of water accounts for seasonal
allocations should also be kept. These accounts
should register the amount of water available for
use by the account holder at any given time – that
is, the volume of water yielded by a water licence
or share should be credited to the account and
actual use debited as it took place; similarly, the
sale or purchase of water allocations during a
given season should be debited or credited to the
account. This function is essential to ensure that
no one uses more water than they have access to. 
Water use for irrigated farming in Alberta
currently is not measured by a water meter but
estimated based on pumping rate, area irrigated,
and number of water applications. Accordingly,
meters should be installed to monitor water use to
ensure that water sold was not used by the seller.
The introduction of meters has been considered
for some time in Alberta, but its high cost has so
far impeded implementation, although licensed
water users in the Milk River watershed recently
agreed to install them (Taylor 2009). The
Commentary 302  | 11
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
9 This separation of land and water assets has a number of implications for banks, assessors, tax and stamp duty officers, councils, and property
professionals, as well as licence holders; see Bjornlund (2008b).| 12 Commentary 302 
comprehensive use of meters and rigid accounting
procedures for both allocations and entitlements
would give the system additional transparency and
credibility – issues that will become increasingly
important as scarcity intensifies and the value of
water increases.
Step 3: Improve Existing Market
Mechanisms, Processes, and Instruments
Once adequate protected waters to secure conser-
vation objectives have been secured through the
planning process and the consumptive pool estab-
lished, water available for consumptive use should
freely be traded among competing users to obtain the
maximum economic output from this resource. 
Experience in other jurisdictions illustrates that
market activities can accelerate rapidly as scarcity
increases, as water users become familiar with the
operations of the market, and as allocation
structures become more accommodating and
barriers to trade are removed (see the Appendix).
Since the current reform process and the
recommendations set out above would achieve
many of these outcomes, steps should be taken
now to improve the market mechanisms and
transfer processes so that they are able to cope
with the increased activity level when needed.
Experience in emerging markets for other
commodities, such as electricity, suggests that the
use of derivative instruments such as options and
futures achieves bigger efficiency improvements
than trading in the commodity itself (see, for
example, ACIL Tasman 2003). How other water
products can be used should also be investigated.
WATER IMPACT ASSESSMENT ISSUES: Separating
the right to use water from ownership of the water
licence, as noted above, should remove many of
the current complexities or barriers to trade. It
would separate the trade assessment from  the
likely impact of the new owner’s water use in the
new location. In the absence of such a separation,
however, it would be beneficial to define a
number of categories of transfers – for example,
transfers with little or no potential impact
requiring little or no assessment; those with some
potential impact, requiring more assessment; and
those with potential significant impact, requiring
full assessment.
If potential traders knew which category their
potential transfer belonged to, they could assess
the risk associated with their trade being
approved. Such classification would be further
facilitated if trading zones were defined within
which trading would take place with minimum or
no oversight, as such transfers would have no
negative impact on the environment or other
extractive users. Likewise, there should be clear
rules about how water could be traded between
zones. Trade might be prohibited explicitly
between some zones or subject to some kind of
claw back between other zones to account for
transmission losses or other identified impacts.
This would enable potential buyers and sellers to
target their search for potential partners in a
transaction and inform the parties about the
complications or costs associated with trading
with a particular third party.
Since irrigation districts account for 71 percent
of all water withdrawals for consumptive use in
the South Saskatchewan River basin (Alberta
2002), irrigators, either individually or as part of a
district, likely would play a vital part in providing
water to meet increased demand from other
sectors. It is important, therefore, that district
licences be amended to create more flexibility in
use. Once conservation objectives are secured, it is
essential that districts be able to transfer to other
users water that is not needed for irrigation and
that irrigators within districts be able to make
sound business decisions about whether to use
their water during any given season or sell it.
IMPROVING INFORMATION FLOW, TRADING
OPTIONS, AND AGENCY CAPACITY: Under current
legislation, new users within closed basins could
be granted a licence with no volume attached,
enabling them to purchase water in the form of
assignments. Some new users could choose this
option as a start-up solution while they identify
potential sellers and negotiate the purchase of
sufficient licensed allocation. It would also make it
easier for new users to enter into long-term
agreements or conditional options with irrigation
districts or private licence holders, who have
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excess water but are unwilling to sell their licence,
to purchase assignments on an ongoing basis.
The flow of market information between buyers
and sellers also should be improved. There is a
need for a common marketplace where buyers and
sellers can post their offers to buy or sell what
volume, at what price, and within which trading
zone. In the first instance, this could simply be
posted on a notice board on Alberta
Environment’s website, with a hard copy posted at
the local Alberta Environment office.10 This
facility should also provide information about past
sales – such as date, volume traded, price paid,
and trading zone – which would allow potential
buyers and sellers to identify each other, assess
whether the trade was likely to be approved, and
whether the price was reasonable, and could also
help potential buyers and sellers to contact each
other and engage in the process of offers and
counteroffers.11 Identities would be revealed if an
agreement was reached, and it could then be left
to the parties to conclude the deal with or without
intermediaries. To ensure that such facilities and
processes are put in place and adequately
maintained and that transactions are processed in
a timely manner, however, the human and
institutional capacity of the relevant agencies
would have to be augmented.
Experience in other jurisdictions – particularly
the United States (see Brown et al. 1982; Gardner
1985) and Australia (see Bjornlund 2006) –
suggests that such trading facilities, combined
with the availability of market intermediaries such
as those active in the property and stock markets,
could increase market activity and generate more
efficient market outcomes. 
It has been argued that the use of options and
futures would enhance the ability of water users to
manage scarcity. Some US cities, for example, use
conditional options to secure water for urban
purposes during predetermined climatic
conditions (Shupe, Weatherford, and Checchio
1989). Under such an arrangement, the seller
receives an upfront payment to give the buyer a
secure option to buy allocations during seasons in
which precipitation or dam levels reach certain
critical thresholds by a certain date at an agreed
price. Such agreements between farmers and cities
enable the latter to secure marginal demand
during critical periods while the rural user retains
ownership of the licence (see Byrne, Crase, and
Dollery 2010). There is no reason similar
arrangements should not be beneficial between
other high- and low-value users such as wheat and
potato growers in Alberta. The use of futures
contracts would allow producers with long-term
contracts to lock in the cost and availability of
water relative to future commitments to deliver
produce at predetermined prices. 
Once the public interest needs have been agreed
on, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could
be allowed to purchase water in the market to
increase the provision of public benefits to levels
satisfying their needs in excess of what is provided
through the planning process. In that way,
minimum public benefit provisions would be made
based on community values, while additional
benefits could be derived through the market. The
debate in Alberta so far has not favoured allowing
private individuals or NGOs to hold water licences
for in-stream purposes, the concern apparently
being that NGOs might apply for water licences in
catchments that are not closed. However, if private
individuals and NGOs were only allowed to buy
water licences this would not be a concern; instead,
it would open up opportunities for concerned
citizens to take practical steps at their own expense
to secure additional public benefits while
compensating sellers. This kind of market activity
has been quite active in the United States (see
Hadjigeorgalis 2010) and is emerging in Australia
(Bennett 2008).
WATER-PRICING REGIMES: The many ways to
promote a more active water market and to
facilitate a more effective reallocation of water
from low- to high-value users are not complete
without highlighting the potential influence of
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industrial milk quotas. With water trading, however, purchasers and sellers could buy from one another, rather than through a clearing house, to
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introducing a full-cost-recovery pricing regime. In
Australia, there is no doubt that the introduction
of full-cost-recovery prices and water markets has
encouraged many low-value producers to sell
either their water entitlement or their water
allocation on an ongoing basis. The double
incentive of avoiding the increased cost of using
the water and receiving a price for the water in the
market has caused many Australian irrigators to
rethink their farm business. This has been
especially true during periods of extreme water
scarcity and with strong demand from high-value
users such as vineyards and other horticultural
users as well as from the dairy sector. In essence,
water pricing is the most efficient economic
instrument with which to force low-value
producers to sell their water. If the price is set such
that producing the lowest-value crops will
generate a loss, irrigators would be faced with a
choice of either increasing their productivity or
selling their water
Alberta, however, must consider carefully how
best to implement water-pricing reform. The
Water for Life strategy is quite explicit that
economic instruments, which includes water
pricing, will be used “as necessary” to achieve its
objectives, but so far there has been little or no
mention of water pricing, and debates about this
particular instrument are likely to be heated.
Moreover, the irrigation sector is largely a price
taker on the international market, and could not
pass on the extra cost but would have to absorb it
in their budgets. Many Alberta irrigators produce
relatively low-value crops, so that if a price level is
set that makes it unviable for irrigators to produce
they would have to sell their water. However, if
high-value producers willing to buy the water are
not forthcoming, or if government is not willing
to purchase it for the sake of the environment,
low-value users would simply have to forgo using
their water. While such a solution would be
efficient in the sense that it by default would
provide increased flow for the environment and
produce an increased security level for high-value
users, it would also create financial and social
hardship among the lowest-value producers and
might result in an unintended large reduction in
the production of lower value crops. This in turn
might have flow- on effects in other industries
that depend on these crops. Hence, while there is
no doubt that full-cost-recovery prices would be
preferable in all sectors, there are questions to
which answers must be known before such a
pricing regime can be implemented in Alberta’s
irrigation sector without unintended
consequences.
Conclusions
The closure of the South Saskatchewan River
basin puts the need for urgent action on water use
into focus. Without an option to transfer water
from old to new users, Alberta’s continued
economic development and its ecosystems could
be threatened. It is also a reminder for other
basins, such as those that depend on water for use
in resource extraction processes, that it is time to
implement reforms capable of dealing with
increasing scarcity. Any solutions, however, should
be sufficiently robust to apply to all basins and be
capable of handling whatever the future might
bring in terms of climate change, changing
community values, and economic pressures. 
The most urgent action should be to define and
secure protected waters to support water
conservation objectives. Two types of water
protection are needed to meet in-stream needs and
to create environmental events to ensure the
continued health of the riverine environment. Since
the in-stream component would be best secured
outside the licensing system, these minimum flows
should be secured before extractive use is permitted;
alternatively, the provincial government could
purchase senior licences to secure this water. The
environmental events component should be secured
by a portfolio of FITFIR licences of different
priorities to enable the custodian of these licences
to manage environmental events effectively. 
With such a system in place, the consumptive
component of water could be defined, and a
relatively free market would move this water
around efficiently among competing users to
maximize the economic benefit and reduce the
socioeconomic impact of securing protected waters.
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In this context, the first issue that should be
addressed is that of unused and underused
licences. As scarcity increases, markets become
more widely adopted, and water entitlements and
allocations gain value, more and more unused
water will be activated. Within a fully committed
basin, increased activation would come at a cost
either to the environment or to junior extractive
licence holders, depending on how the protected
waters were secured. If the in-stream flow
component were secured outside the licensing
system, the cost would be borne by junior licence
holders – as unused senior licences are activated,
some junior licences would be cut off. If protected
waters were secured by new junior licences, then
the needs of the environment might not be met. 
Second, steps should be taken to facilitate the
efficient operation of markets. For instance, a tier
of transfers should be established, each requiring
different levels of assessment, as well as trading
zones within which little or no assessment is
needed and clear rules about how trading can take
place between them. These measures could be
implemented immediately, allowing buyers and
sellers to enter into transfers more confident of the
outcome. In a similar vein, the flow of
information about supply, demand, prices, and
past transactions should be easily accessible so that
buyers and sellers can identify each other and
establish the current price. This could be done, in
the first instance, through some kind of “bulletin
board” managed by Alberta Environment.
Third, land and water should be separated into
different assets on which transactions and legal
instruments can be registered and secured. The
right to use the water should be separated from
ownership of the licence so that ownership can
change without the need for any assessment. As
well, alternatives to the current FITFIR system
should be considered, since it is unlikely the best
mechanism with which to manage increasingly
scarce water resources for a sustainable
environment and communities. Moreover, since
the pain of the transition to any new system might
not be shared equally among users, any reforms in
that direction should considered carefully for their
financial impact on existing licence holders.
Finally, it is imperative that Canadians
understand and accept that the problem of water
management is one that they have created
collectively through the introduction by elected
officials of policies and economic incentives to
increase water use in pursuit of what has been
perceived as in the public interest. If the best
public outcome no longer can be achieved by
continuing past practices, new policies must be
devised to achieve that result, and taxpayers will
have to be prepared to share the burden of
changing outmoded practices just as they shared
the benefits in the past.
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for water markets, why have so few markets
emerged around the world? Indeed, in only a few
places – among them Australia, the United States,
Chile, South Africa, and Alberta – have water
markets been formally introduced. In some
developing countries, such as India and Pakistan,
informal and, in many instances, illegal markets in
temporary access to water have been active, while
in other countries, such as Spain and Oman,
variations of water trading have been in use for a
long time (see Maas and Anderson 1978; Al-
Marshudi 2007).
Capacity Challenges: The Need for Complex
Institutional and Governance Structures
One reason markets have not been widely
introduced relates to the complexity of the systems
and institutions that are required for markets to
function efficiently, which need extensive human
and financial capital that is absent in many
developing countries. In Chile, for example, there is
a multitude of registers, and many entitlements are
not registered, which leads to legal uncertainty
about ownership (see Bjornlund and McKay 2002).
As in Alberta, traders in jurisdictions such as
Australia and Chile find the transfer process
cumbersome due, for example, to the need to
produce irrigation and drainage management plans,
to prove their use of best-management practices,
and the need to advertise – all of which is costly
both in time and money and with uncertain
outcomes (see Tural et al. 2005). In southeastern
Australia, however, as restrictions on trading eased
and scarcity intensified, trading activities increased.
When drought intensified in 1997, the number of
transfers increased significantly, forcing authorities
to introduce automated transfer processing to cope
with the increased volume (Bjornlund 2003a). This
development saw the emergence of a large number
of brokers and private water exchanges, improving
the availability of market intermediaries and access
to real-time information about supply and demand
in the market. This put a trading platform in place
that since 2002 has coped with and facilitated an
explosion in market activities (Bjornlund 2008c). In
Chile, high transaction costs and unpredictable
market outcomes caused by costly judicial
procedures, often taking years to conclude, have
been identified as major impediments to water trade
(Bauer 1997; Brisco, Salas, and PeZa 1998), as have
confusing and multiple registers or water rights and
inflexible supply systems (Hadjigeorgalis and
Lillywhite 2004).
Since a new water policy framework was put in
place in Australia in 1994 (CoAG 1994), water
policy and management has been on a long and
increasingly urgent reform journey. Land and water
rights have been separated so that water entitlements
can be traded more easily, trading zones have been
established with clear rules about how water can be
traded between them, and water planning processes
have been made mandatory for all watersheds in
order to establish the total volume of water available
and to identify environmental needs – and thereby
to determine how much water can be extracted
sustainably and shared among extractive users (the
consumptive pool). 
In Australia it was also argued that the water
entitlement should be unbundled into its
components to improve water users’ ability to
manage their access to water and the risk associated
with its availability and delivery within a planning
framework that defines the consumptive pool as
the volume of water left once environmental needs
have been met (see Bjornlund 2000, 2004b; Young
and McColl 2002, 2003). With the National
Water Initiative (CoAG 2004) and associated
reforms at the state level, most of these proposed
changes have been implemented. Water
entitlements have been unbundled into:
￿ a water access entitlement, a document ensuring
the holder of the right access to a share of the
available consumptive pool each year;
￿ a water allocation, the volume of water that the
allocation holder can extract from the resource
for consumptive purposes during a given
season; this water can be derived either as the
yield from a water access entitlement owned by
the allocation holder or through purchases in
the allocation market;
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allocation to consumptive use, which is site and
purpose specific; to obtain it, the user must
prove responsible water use with no adverse
environmental impact; and
￿ a capacity share, which guarantees the holder
access to a defined share of the supply capacity
of the system delivering the water to the user.
As a consequence of these changes, trading in both
entitlements and allocations now takes place
without any assessment of the impact of the
buyer’s use of the water, since the purchase of the
water includes no right to use it or get it supplied.
To use the water, the buyer must have the
appropriate use right, must have a supply capacity
share, and must be located in a zone to which the
water can be traded. Obtaining the use right is a
separate process and does not delay transfers. It is
up to buyers to ensure that they have the
appropriate use right and supply capacity share or
to take the chance that such right will be obtained
subsequent to the purchase.
Australian jurisdictions currently are introducing
water registers to manage water entitlements,
register trades, and secure the integrity of the
transfer process and ownership of the entitlements
and legal interests such as liens, mortgages, and
encumbrances registered against the entitlement.
Similarly, water allocation accounts have been
introduced to record seasonal access to and use of
water. For instance, when the allocation is
announced at the beginning of the season as a
percentage of the entitlement, the available volume
of water yielded by a given entitlement is credited
to the entitlement holders’ allocation account; as
the allocation is revised during the season, any
additional water yielded by the entitlement is also
credited to the account. If the entitlement holder
sells or buys allocation during the season, these
volumes are also debited or credited to the
account. A person without a water entitlement can
also hold an allocation account and get water
bought in the allocation market credited to the
account. Each quarter, water use is debited to the
account according to meter readings. Such registers
are essential in controlling ownership, and a
consistent debit and credit system ensures that the
total volume of water entitlements stays constant
and that extraction stays within the consumptive
pool, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the
system.
Community and Social Concerns 
A second set of reasons water markets have been
slow to develop relates to the perception of water as
a social good, one not subject to market forces, and
to the potential impact of trade on affected farmers
and their communities. A rational analyst might
argue that much of this impact will occur regardless
of water trading as a result of inevitable and ongoing
structural adjustment in response to changing
economic, political, and climatic conditions.
Nevertheless, experience in Australia, the United
States, and Chile is unanimous that this perception
might be the main reason for the low level of
adoption of water trading. In Australia, there are
examples of sellers being frozen out of their
communities because selling water is perceived as
treason and as selling out the community (Fenton
2007). Experience with both the Balsaz transfer and
the dispute over the amendment of irrigation
district licences highlights the controversial nature of
this issue in Alberta as well. 
Australian research provides some insight into
how irrigators and their communities see these
social concerns. A 1998-99 survey of buyers and
sellers in the allocation market and of irrigators
who had never traded revealed that more than 80
percent of those trading, but only 48 percent of
those who had never traded, agreed that water
trading was a good idea. More than 60 percent said
that they agreed with allocation trading, since the
water right stays with the seller, while a similar
percentage agreed that entitlement trading was
needed to justify long-term investment (Bjornlund
2005). A 2003-06 survey of traders indicated that
considerable concern over water trading still
existed, with more than 80 percent agreeing with
statements related to the negative impact of
(Cont’d) Appendix A
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trading (Bjornlund 2008a). One main concern was
associated with the impact both on individual
farmers and on their communities of trading out
of districts. Another concern related to the
concentration of water in fewer hands and the
emergence of more corporate farming and
speculative market behaviour.12
Australian surveys have also revealed that
irrigators not selling their water were concerned
about stranded assets and the associated increase in
cost to them of large volumes of water being
traded out of their supply system. Since irrigators
pay the full cost of water and most costs are fixed,
a reduced volume of supply would result in
increased cost per unit delivered. There was also a
concern that eventually it would be unviable to
keep certain channels open and that remaining
farmers would be unable to irrigate, thus suffering
substantial capital losses. In the state of Victoria,
which acknowledges both of these impacts, water
charges have been divided into two parts to
accommodate the first concern. The first part
covers the fixed cost of the system and the second
the variable costs associated with managing the
system. The charge covering the fixed cost is
charged against the supply capacity share and
remains with the seller if the water is sold to
outside the system. Hence the sellers are obligated
to continue to pay their share of the maintenance
of the system. Regarding the second concern, the
state government has promised to compensate
farmers for the lost property value associated with
losing the ability to irrigate (Victoria 2004). 
Another concern is that, as farmers sell their
water, many farms are left uncultivated. In many
instances, speculators have purchased properties,
sold the water, and simply left most of the
buildings and land unattended, which then
become a haven for weeds and pests and a nuisance
to neighbouring farmers.13
Community members are also concerned that
the sale of a large proportion of a region’s water
will result in community decline. A transition from
irrigated to dry land farming or to no farming at
all would result in decreasing farm revenues, job
losses, and declining business for local providers of
farm input and services, leading to declining
population and reduced demand for local
businesses and services, schools, child care, and
doctors. Community members are also concerned
that, as irrigated land is converted to dry land, its
value will decline, thus reducing the tax base.
Thus, either property taxes must increase for all
properties or the community’s revenue will decline,
eroding services such as local roads and libraries.
These developments potentially reduce community
viability and the ability to retain the local culture
as the pillars that support the community
disappear.14
The increased use of markets and the associated
separation of land and water rights also give
speculators and corporate farms an opportunity to
enter the market. In Australia, there is widespread
fear in irrigation communities that this will occur,
with water ultimately ending up in the control of
people without any affiliation with the local
community and the emergence of “water barons”
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12 A series of 32 focus groups with farmers in 2003 discussed these concerns in more detail; see Bjornlund (2003b).
13 For the Australian experience with this problem, see Edwards, Bjornlund, and Cheers (2007); and Fenton (2007). Similar outcomes have been
reported in parts of the United States; see Colby (1988); and Young and Taylor (1990).
14 Both Edwards, Bjornlund, and Cheers (2007) and Fenton (2007) report the emergence of these impacts in Australia, but do not differentiate
evidence of a causal relationship between community decline and water trading, on the one hand, and the impact of severe drought, on the
other. Such concerns have also been reported in the United States, where, in the early years of water markets, urban centres in the southwest
purchased huge volumes of irrigation water from some communities (see Mumme and Ingram 1985; Checchio and Colby 1988; DuMars and
Minnis 1989; and Gilliand, Wallin, and Smaus 1989), and in Chile (Romano and Leporati 2002). Possibly the most extreme example of this
comes from California, where, during the 1920s and 1930s, Los Angeles purchased all the water in the Owens Valley, resulting in a 20 percent
population drop in that region, the closure of six schools, and a 50 percent drop in sales by local businesses. Claims against the city for loss of
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who control the supply of water and set prices
(Bjornlund 2003b).15 The Victorian government’s
response has been to limit the proportion of the
consumptive pool that any given person or entity
can own within a system.
Public Interest Concerns
Public interest concerns relate to securing water for
public benefits – primarily to secure adequate in-
stream flows to support healthy ecosystems and key
environmental assets by enabling the creation of
environmental events such as floods. Public benefits
can also include social and community needs or
water for recreational and cultural purposes. What is
considered to be an adequate supply of water for
public benefits should be defined in accordance with
local community values, supported by the best
available science. The market, however, is unlikely to
supply adequate water to ensure that public benefits
are obtained, since it operates between individuals
who seek to maximize their own benefits.
In the United States, NGOs have made extensive
use of the market to secure water for public benefits
(Hadjigeogalis 2010). In most jurisdictions,
however, this is not likely to be the case, as the
population base and the financial capacity of the
population might not give NGOs the means to
purchase sufficient water. Perhaps more important,
there is no certainty that the public benefit values of
these NGOs reflect those of the wider community
or that the sum of such purchases will be enough to
satisfy public demand. In Australia, planning
processes are defining the public benefit needs on a
watershed basis. Licences are not issued for the
water needed to secure these objectives; instead,
water is set aside before the consumptive pool is
established. In other words, the public benefit water
is secured first and entitlement holders get access to
what is left.16
The issue of securing water to provide public
benefits is of utmost importance for the
community acceptance of water markets and for
their efficient operation, since only within such a
system can water trading take place without
complex processes.
Get Started before Reform Becomes 
Too Complicated and Expensive
In most societies, there has been a tendency to
postpone major water reforms. From a political
perspective, this is often preferable, as significant
reform of water management is associated with a
high level of conflict among competing users,
emotional community debates, and significant
community pain. Further, individual users have
long-standing rights to these resources, which, in
many cases, are associated with significant capital
investments. Changing the way people are able to
use and access such rights, therefore, can have
serious consequences. Experience from around the
world suggests, however, that it is actually a lot
easier and cheaper in economic, social, and
political terms to introduce reforms before scarcity
intensifies conflicts over access and use. 
For water markets to work water must be scarce;
if users simply can apply for a licence to use water
and get it for free, a market has limited useful
purpose. When a basin is closed for new licences,
as happened in South Australia in the early 1980s
and in Alberta in 2006, a market is needed as a
mechanism for new users to access water. But as
long as existing licence holders have access to use
(Cont’d) Appendix A
15 In the horticultural regions, in particular, there are fears about the impact of corporate farming, as these operations buy up large volumes of water
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been the backbone of this industry (Edwards, Bjornlund, and Cheers 2008; Kuehne, Bjornlund, and Loch 2009). The major instigator of this
development, however, has been tax incentives, rather than the introduction of water trading.
16 In the current severe drought, however, consumptive users are allowed to access public benefit water and, as a tool to secure environmental water,
the planning process has disintegrated to reduce the social pain. In response, the Federal Government in Australian as well as state governments,
the Murray Darling Basin Association, and various semi-public organizations increasingly are relying on water markets to purchase water from
willing sellers to secure environmental outcomes (Connell and Grafton 2008; Loch, Bjornlund, and Kuehne, 2010). This illustrates that the
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more water than they need, a market is not likely
to be very active since it is mainly new users who
will need to resort to it. If water becomes scarce,
however, the consumptive pool will be reduced
and market activities will increase.
In Australia, increased scarcity resulted in a
sharp increase in transfer applications over just a
few years, for which the authorities were totally
unprepared, resulting in long transfer processes
that undermined the smooth functioning of the
market (Bjornlund 2003a). Electronic water
exchanges and transfer processes were introduced
to handle the increased volume. As a result of
increased scarcity, improved transfer processes, an
easing of trading restrictions, and increased
irrigator familiarity with the process, market
participation increased from a few percent of farm
businesses trading each year to more than 60
percent by 2004 (Bjornlund 2006). Similarly,
water purchased in the allocation market
accounted for an increasing proportion of total
water use, increasing from only 3 to 5 percent of
water use in the mid-1990s to more than one-third
by 2008 (Bjornlund and Rossini, 2010). While it
could be argued that the entitlement market in
Australia still has a limited influence on who owns
water entitlements, the allocation market now has
a significant influence on who uses water each year.
So, when scarcity intensifies and as irrigators
become familiar with the use of water markets,
acivities in these markets can increase quickly.
(Cont’d) Appendix A
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Allocation market: A generic term used in this
paper to represent all markets in which the short-
term right to use a certain volume of the seasonal
allocation of water is traded, while the seller
continues to own the long-term entitlement. This
market is sometimes called the “temporary market,”
the “short-term market,” the “spot market,” or, in
Alberta “assignments.”
Assignments: Under the Water Act an assignment is
the transfer of the right to use a volume of water
during a given season from one licence holder to
another.
Consumptive flow:The flow of an unregulated
river in excess of the protected waters, that is the
flow that can be extracted for consumptive use
without compromising the public interest as
defined in the water management plan.
Consumptive pool:The pool of water available
within a regulated river system that is in excess of
the protected waters. Thist is the pool of water that
can be extracted from the system without
compromising the public interest as defined in the
water management plan.
Entitlement market: A generic term used in this
paper to represent all markets in which the long-
term entitlements to receive water allocation each
season are traded. This has often been termed the
“permanent market,” the “water rights market,” or,
in Alberta, the “market for licensed water
allocations.”
Environmental events component: A sufficient
volume of water set aside as part of the protected
water to secure regular environmental events such
as flooding of surrounding riparian lands to
facilitate germination of seeds and in other ways to
support the lifecycle of flora and fauna.
In-stream flow component: A sufficient volume of
water set aside as part of the protected waters to
secure sufficient river flow to maintain healthy
ecosystems that ensure adequate water quality for
human consumption, recreation and economic use
while taking into account evaporation and other
transmission losses.
Protected waters: Water set aside as part of a water
management plan to secure water conservation
objectives and consisting of an in-stream
component and an environmental events
component.
Water allocations:The volume of water that the
licence holder has the right to extract from the river
and under the Water Act includes the “volume, rate
and timing of a diversion of water.” 
Water allocation transfer: Occurs when existing
licence holders sell all or part of their licensed
allocation to another person or organization. When
this happen the traded allocation is separated from
the seller’s land and a new licence is created and the
water attached to the buyers land with the same
seniority as the seller. Such transfers have to be
approved by Alberta Environment. Conditions can
be placed on the transfers and up to 10 percent of
the allocation can be withheld by the Director to
implement water conservation objectives. Transfers
can only take place as authorized by an approved
water management plan.  
Water conservation objectives: are defined under
the Water Act as the amount and quality of water
necessary to protect the aquatic environment as
well as recreational, tourism, transportation, and
waste assimilation uses of water. In the context of
this paper this can also include water set aside to
meet cultural or social needs as defined within a
water management plan.
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